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1.   Main claims and the question that arises 
As reflected in the title of their book, Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone maintain that there are 
two ways in which language productions (spoken or written) can engage our minds. On the 
one hand, there are linguistic conventions, which are entirely responsible for the public 
propositional content that our utterances convey, so grasping that content is a matter of 
knowing the relevant conventions. These contents are entered on the conversational 
scoreboard, which keeps a record of our meaning-making and the constraints on it.
1
 On the 
other hand, certain uses of language call for an (often open-ended) imaginative engagement 
with the imagery of an utterance; these include various kinds of figurative uses of language, 
certain evocative literal uses, and cases of ‘invited inference’. This kind of activity has an 
essentially private significance; although interlocutors may end up sharing insights by this 
means, those are not components of the public meaning-making endeavour. 
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  The notion of convention employed is that of Lewis (1969) and the metaphor of the ‘conversational 
scoreboard’ is from Lewis (1979). 
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 The following question arises: where is pragmatics in this account of linguistic 
communication? The first of the two modes of linguistic engagement given above constitutes 
semantics, a social convention-bound competence. The second is something else altogether 
(neither a matter of semantics nor pragmatics), a much less regulated, more exploratory, range 
of inferential and associative processes. Lepore and Stone’s account boldly and provocatively 
argues that the long-standing Gricean, neo-Gricean and relevance-theoretic pragmatic 
accounts of utterance interpretation and thus of the semantics-pragmatic distinction are all 
quite mistaken. Lepore and Stone (henceforth L&S) have a very expansive view of semantics: 
‘Interlocutors are normally coordinating on a process of inquiry, through which they commit 
to make their meanings public. Semantics, we suggest, describes the social competence that 
specifically supports this coordinate inquiry’ (p.256) and a very diminished view of 
pragmatics: ‘Pragmatics merely disambiguates; pragmatic reasoning never contributes content 
to utterances.’ (p.83, and reiterated throughout). So linguistic conventions provide all the 
content that the speaker is presenting for public meaning consumption and, in cases where the 
language provides more than one meaning convention for a word or a structure in the 
utterance, pragmatics has the role of selecting among them. Furthermore, the pragmatics 
involved doesn’t appeal to anything like Grice’s Cooperative Principle and conversational 
maxims, or to anything like the cognitively-based ‘presumption of optimal relevance’ which 
drives utterance interpretation in Sperber & Wilson’s (1995) Relevance Theory (RT). Rather: 
‘[It] typically exploits shallow cues rather than deep inferences about the speaker’s mental 
state’ (p.265). The idea is that disambiguation is a matter of finding a coherent interpretation 
on the basis of familiar patterns of language usage and salient contextual factors; it is not 
governed by any principles or presumptions specific to ostensive communicative behaviour 
and is not geared to the recovery of a speaker’s m-intention (Grice) or communicative 
intention (Sperber & Wilson). 
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 It is a great strength of the book that it gives close attention to a wide range of subtle 
components of conventional or encoded linguistic meaning, including many that are non-
truth-conditional and function to do things like place constraints on the context, on anaphoric 
reference, on temporal interpretation, and on speech act interpretation. The chapter on 
information structure is particularly interesting in its attention to prosodic features 
(contrastive stress, particular intonation contours) and discourse connectives like ‘well’ and 
‘however’ that play an important role in (linguistically) signalling areas of (dis)agreement 
between interlocutors. I agree with L&S that many philosophers of language and 
pragmaticists in the Gricean tradition give insufficient weight to these rich contributions from 
linguistic systems and opt for an overly bare-bones semantics, wielding (Modified) Occam’s 
Razor in a fashion that has little bearing on the psychological reality of our linguistic 
knowledge or indeed of human memory more generally. This is not, however, true of the RT 
framework, within which generations of researchers have developed accounts of structures, 
words and morphemes in many different languages, employing what is known as ‘procedural 
semantics’, an approach which has been applied to many of the non-truth-conditional 
components of linguistic meaning that interest L&S.
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 However, there is a ‘baby with the bathwater’ worry with the approach presented in 
this book, which so drastically reduces the work of pragmatics and dispenses with, or aims to 
dispense with, the class of conversational implicatures entirely (all the familiar cases are 
claimed to be either the result of a linguistic convention or, as in figurative uses of language, 
the effects of imaginative processes that are not instances of speaker meaning). I won’t be 
trying to defend a Gricean account here, or even an RT approach,
3
 although I’ll suggest along 
the way that something like the latter sort of cognitively-based account is often needed in 
order to infer intended utterance content from the rich (but underdetermining) clues provided 
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  See, for instance, Blakemore (1987), Wilson & Sperber (1993), and Escandell-Vidal et al. (2011). 
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  See Bezuidenhout (2016) for a thoughtful critique of L&S’s discussion of Relevance Theory. 
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by the language system. The main aim of this short critical review is to provide evidence, 
through discussion of specific utterance examples, to support the claim that there are 
significant pragmatic contributions to the content correctly grasped by an addressee (and thus 
that pragmatics contributes to the information that is registered on the conversational record). 
 
2.    Cases of pragmatically inferred content 
Let’s start with the case of scalar implicature, which so dominates the neo-Gricean literature 
and which L&S themselves explicitly consider. Two of the familiar cases involve utterances 
of the forms ‘Some of the X …’ and ‘P or Q’, which are standardly analysed as 
conversationally implicating ‘Not all of the X …’ and ‘Not (P and Q)’, respectively:  
 
1. a.    ‘Mary ate some of the cookies’    Mary didn’t eat all of the cookies 
 b.    ‘John is out with friends or visiting his aunt’    John isn’t out with friends  
          and visiting his aunt  
 
L&S maintain that the more specific interpretation here is a matter of linguistic rules or 
conventions: ‘Some of the X’ is ambiguous between the at least one X meaning and the more 
specific upper-bounded meaning. The role of pragmatics is, at most, to disambiguate (there is 
no pragmatic enrichment of semantically given content, and, in particular, no conversational 
implicature). On this view, the entailment scales that play the pivotal role here, e.g. <some, 
all>, <or, and>, are lexically stipulated and other linguistic devices (e.g. stress, intonation) 
may indicate that the stronger reading is the right one. The line of argument is quite 
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convincing and a number of other theorists have also opted for a ‘conventionalist’ account of 
these standard scalar cases (e.g. Chierchia et al. 2012).
4
  
 However, the interesting cases for the current issue of pragmatics vs. linguistic 
convention are those discussed by Hirschberg (1991) as involving ‘ad hoc scales’ or ordered 
stages in a process, which seem to support scalar implicature or something very closely akin 
to it: 
 
2. A:  Have you mailed that letter? 
 B:  I’m typing it right now. 
    B hasn’t mailed the letter yet. 
 
3. Frantic husband rushes into maternity hospital and says to nurse: 
 ‘I’m late – it’ll be a disaster if I’ve missed the birth.’ 
        [Or perhaps he says nothing, but just rushes up to her looking anxious.] 
 Nurse:  Calm down.  She’s in the theatre waiting area. 
   The birth hasn’t happened yet, so the husband hasn’t missed it.  
 
In (2), the implication depends on the fact that, typically, there are various ordered stages 
involved in the sending of a letter: formulating it, typing or handwriting it, maybe proof-
reading and signing it, putting it in an envelope, and getting it into the mail system. In (3), the 
implication depends on there being stages of giving birth in a particular hospital setting: early 
labour, hospital admission, getting appropriately gowned and sitting in the waiting area, more 
advanced labour with admission to the birthing theatre, and so on. These are clearly not cases 
of lexically provided scales of items, but are entirely to do with general knowledge about how 
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  However, see Geurts (2010) for detailed and empirically supported arguments against conventionalist accounts 
of scalar implicatures.   
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things work in the world. The inferences drawn hinge on believing that if a person is at one 
stage of the process they have not yet reached what is typically a later stage. It is 
straightforward enough to give Gricean rational reconstructions of the derivation of these 
meanings, employing a line of reasoning very similar to the standard scalar cases, governed 
by the maxims of quantity and relation (see Hirschberg 1991, Geurts 2010: 31).  
 These are cases of conversational implicature, as Grice conceived of this construct 
(Grice 1989), and they make important contributions to the conversation, contributions which 
one might reasonably think would be recorded on the conversational scoreboard/record. To 
use L&S’s terminology, they are public contributions to the inquiry at issue and involve 
certain commitments on the part of the interlocutors. However, given L&S’s strictures, they 
won’t be registered on the scoreboard because they are not wholly a function of linguistic 
conventions. This looks like a clear problem for their view.  
 Many post-Gricean pragmatic theorists think there is more to the role of pragmatics in 
utterance understanding than the derivation of conversational implicatures. In fact, a lot of 
implicatures, especially (but not only) those initially categorised as ‘generalised’, have been 
reanalysed as cases of ‘pragmatic enrichment’ which contribute to the recovery of the 
proposition that is taken to have been directly communicated by the speaker (‘what is said’ in 
the terms of Recanati (2004), ‘explicature’ in RT terms). Consider two examples of what can 
be described as relevance-based, local pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content 
(both taken from Simons (forthcoming)): 
 
4. A:  What’s making all that noise in the attic?  
 B:   Either there’s a nest up there or some squirrels have moved in. 
  [ ‘nest’ understood to mean occupied (by birds) nest ] 
 
5. A:    I’ll see you next month at the conference in Boston.  
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 B:    Yes, great. Actually, if I rent a car, would you like to travel with me?  
   [ ‘rent a car’ understood to mean rent a car for the purpose of driving it  
    to Boston ] 
 
These are cases of the enrichment of embedded content, which contributes to the proposition 
expressed (the disjunction in (4) and the conditional in (5)), so they cannot be Gricean 
implicatures, properly speaking. Simons’ primary goal is to show that these can be accounted 
for by Gricean rational reconstructions of a pretty standard sort, a matter of global reasoning 
involving the Cooperative Principle and the maxim of Relation. Without going into the 
details, the reasoning turns on recognising an apparent failure of relevance of the whole 
complex utterance and locating that failure in a subclause, e.g. in (4), the first disjunct ‘there’s 
a nest up there’ isn’t a fully relevant answer to the question about the source of noise (it is not 
nests that emit noise but certain occupants of them).
5
  
 On the face of it, these look very much like cases of pragmatic inferences making a 
contribution to content, to the public meaning, which on L&S’s account should be tracked on 
the conversational record. This richer content often influences the linguistic acts of 
subsequent speakers (e.g. ‘That doesn’t sound like birds to me’ uttered by A in the case of (4), 
or ‘Yes, thanks, but I won’t be able to help with the driving as I’ve lost my license’ in the case 
of (5)), which is one of the key roles envisaged for the conversational record by Lewis (1979). 
But, again, this content won’t be recorded, according to L&S, because it is not the result of a 
linguistic convention (‘nest’ does not have as one of its meanings nest occupied by birds, ‘rent 
a car’ does not have as one of its meanings rent a car for the purpose of driving it to Boston). 
 In fact, there are much simpler cases where some sort of relevance-based pragmatic 
inference is essential for the recovery of the proposition directly expressed and communicated 
by a speaker: 
                                                          
5
  The relevance-theoretic account would work a bit differently (see Carston forthcoming). 
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6. a.     Mary’s picture is the best. 
 b.     Are you ready? 
 c.     The doctor prescribed headache pills and fertility pills. 
 
Relevance theorists and many other pragmaticists would maintain that the linguistically 
provided content in (6a) and (6b) is patently incomplete as regards truth-conditional content 
and pragmatic inference supplies the completion. Even those who might dispute that point 
(e.g. semantic minimalists such as Borg (2004)) would allow that grasping the proposition the 
speaker is expressing (not merely implicating) here requires the derivation of further content 
which is a matter of pragmatics rather than of linguistic convention. In (6a), the picture may 
be a portrait of Mary, it may have been painted by her, just bought by her, her favourite one, 
the one she pointed at earlier on, the one that haunts her dreams, and so on; in (6b), there must 
be some more or less specific activity or event his readiness for which the addressee is being 
asked about (but there are no semantic constraints at all on what that event/activity may be). 
What the two have in common is the fact that no speaker ever intends to communicate just the 
invariant meaning that the linguistic forms alone provide. If asked ‘Mary’s picture in what 
sense?’ or ‘ready for what?’, it would be absurd for the speaker to respond ‘I just mean 
Mary’s picture in some/any sense or other’ or ‘I just mean: are you ready punkt’. In both 
cases, the relevant occasion-specific unit of content has to be pragmatically inferred. In (6c), 
the point is essentially the same but runs a little differently as, arguably, the two compound 
nominals ‘headache pills’ and ‘fertility pills’ are sufficiently conventionalised that a 
pragmatic inference is not now required. However, the conventionalised relation between 
‘pills’ and the nominal modifier is the opposite in the two cases (to reduce, to increase, 
respectively) and the more general point about noun-noun compounds is the absence of any 
constraint on the relation that might hold between them. Consider, for instance, the various 
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nominal relations understood for ‘sweet shop’, ‘honey bee’, ‘mouse mat’, ‘doormat’, 
‘pontoon bridge’, ‘birth mark’, ‘boot camp’, and so on and on. Furthermore, it is not difficult 
to come up with scenarios in which the relation between the head noun and modifying noun is 
other than the one that has become established (e.g. pills that induce headaches (perhaps for 
some experimental purpose) and pills that inhibit fertility). This is all a matter of an initial 
pragmatic inference made in response to a specific contextual goal or concern, with 
subsequent conventionalisation of the relation inferred. In the absence of a particular context, 
all we can say about the meaning of the hypothetical nominal compound ‘whiskers fork’ is 
that it refers to a kind of fork (the syntax gives us that), which is in some relation to whiskers 
(it could be made of them, look like them, be used to do something to them, or whatever other 
possibilities the world allows).
6
 
 To conclude this section: L&S have a task on their hands to explain away a range of 
determinate components of communicated meaning which are significant contributions to the 
inquiry under discussion and should therefore be entered on the public conversational record, 
but which are provided by pragmatic inference rather than by linguistic conventions. 
 
3.    Polysemy and pragmatics 
A case that L&S consider in some detail concerns what is traditionally known as an ‘indirect 
speech act’ (Searle 1975), but which L&S treat as polysemy, that is, as a word or phrase with 
two (or more) related meaning conventions. They discuss the following example (addressed 
to a waiter in a restaurant):  
 
7. X: Can I have the French toast? 
                                                          
6
  For lively discussion of examples of this sort, I am indebted to John Collins, Stephen Neale and Deirdre 
Wilson, at the symposium on Lepore & Stone’s Imagination and Convention. Institute of Philosophy, London, 
19
th
 May 2015. 
 
10 
 
 
This is understood as X placing an order for French toast. According to the traditional 
analysis, the direct speech act is a question about whether something is possible and the 
indirect speech act (a conversational implicature) is a request or order (for French toast). 
According to L&S, however, the word ‘can’ is polysemous; it carries two (or more) speech 
act conventions: (a) the question about possibility, and (b) the placing of an order/request. The 
role of pragmatics here is (as ever and only) to select the contextually appropriate meaning 
convention, which is (b) in this instance, and that selection is made on the basis of general 
knowledge about standard restaurant procedures, without any issue of recovering the 
speaker’s communicative intention. There is no indirect speech act, no pragmatic calculation 
from the ‘literal’ question meaning to the implicated request/order. L&S point out that, in 
keeping with the conventionality of the placing an order meaning of ‘can I?’, different 
linguistic forms are employed in different languages for this purpose; hence there is the 
element of arbitrariness, which they, along with David Lewis, insist is crucial to the notion of 
a convention (p.95). 
 Of course, there are many other ways of using English to place an order in a 
restaurant: 
 
8. a. I would like the French toast.   
 b. I’ll have the French toast.  
 c. I’m in great need of some French toast.  
 d. The French toast (please). 
 e. The French toast would be great. 
 f. You can get me the French toast.  
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But the variation is actually quite constrained, both the variation in the different speech acts 
that ‘can I?’ can be used to express, and in the range of linguistic forms that can be used to 
express the placing of an order. You can’t place an order for French toast by making any old 
statement about French toast:  
 
9. a. I hear that French toast is eaten a lot by French school-children. 
 b. French toast is also known as eggy bread or gypsy toast.    
 
It’s of interest here to consider why the utterance of some sentences about French toast can 
constitute the placing of an order while others cannot. Along with the Griceans, I would 
maintain that the placing an order meaning is calculable from the literal compositional 
meaning of the utterances in (8) - on the basis of our quite complex understanding of 
psychosocial relationships that involve wanting others to do things for us, negotiating with 
them to get what we want, issues that arise from imposing on others, expectations of 
politeness, etc., and, specifically here, the standard social roles and behaviour of customers 
and waiters in restaurants. Given this sort of general knowledge, we can see clearly the 
inferential connection between the literal sentence meanings in (8) and the speech act of 
placing an order/request, a connection which is missing in the case of the utterances in (9).
7
  
 So, even if (some of) these are conventional (or semi-conventional) uses and they are 
not now actually calculated, their origin is a matter of pragmatic inference. As argued in 
detail within Relevance Theory (Carston 2013, Falkum 2015), polysemy very often has its 
basis in pragmatics. For instance, the sense of ‘drink’ as drink alcohol and the sense of 
‘bachelor’ as unmarried man who is eligible for marriage are pragmatically inferred 
narrowings of the more general senses of drink (liquid) and unmarried man, respectively; the 
                                                          
7
 I am going along with L&S’s polysemy analysis here (and arguing for its pragmatic basis), but see Clapp 
(2015) and Bezuidenhout (2016) for a range of observations that indicate the implausibility of any kind of 
ambiguity analysis of these kinds of cases.  
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hyperbolic senses of ‘boiling’, ‘freezing’ and ‘starving’ are pragmatic broadenings of the 
literal senses and the metaphorical senses of ‘angel, ‘saint’, ‘bastard’, ‘cow’, and ‘chameleon’ 
can also be explained pragmatically (see Wilson & Carston 2007 for detailed relevance-based 
pragmatic derivations). So pragmatics is quite often the source of a linguistic convention, and, 
in that sense at least, can be (or can have been) a provider of content, not merely an 
instrument of disambiguation. Lexical meaning evolves and very often it is a (recurrent) 
pragmatic inference that lies at the root of new meanings; yet it seems that on Lepore & 
Stone’s account there is no way for pragmatically derived content to get onto the 
conversational record, as is surely required if that meaning is to acquire the status of a 
linguistic convention. 
 According to L&S, ‘Conventionality and calculability must be incompatible. … 
Conventions require alternatives, but the existence of alternatives means it would be rational 
that the conventional case didn’t hold, and so, you can’t calculate anything from it.’ (p. 104).  
Certainly if a component of utterance meaning cannot be calculated, then it must be 
conventional – this was Grice’s point, I think, in using the calculability requirement as a 
necessary condition on conversational implicatures and thereby distinguishing them from 
conventional implicatures. However, if some element of meaning is calculable (can be 
calculated), it may be derived either pragmatically or via a convention, where the convention 
is one that has a pragmatic (i.e. calculated) origin.   
 As I understand it, Lewis allows for various ways in which an instance of new 
meaning coordination can be achieved (and can, therefore, provide the basis/precedent on 
which a convention may ultimately become established). As L&S say, ‘For Lewis, 
conventions are established gradually. At first, coordination succeeds through other 
mechanisms, like salience, good luck, or partial or tentative precedents’ (p.: 252). It is a 
mystery to me why they do not acknowledge here the role of a pragmatic inferential 
mechanism in achieving an initial coordination. Setting aside ‘good luck’, which doesn’t seem 
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a highly promising mechanism, both ‘salience’ and ‘partial or tentative precedents’ would fall 
within a pragmatic account like that given in relevance theory. Salience is one factor affecting 
the accessibility of interpretations, the more accessible an interpretation the more likely it is to 
be assessed for relevance (cognitive implications), and an interpretation selected as optimally 
relevant on a particular occasion may become a linguistic convention through repeated use 
and weight of precedent. As Lewis says, some conventions arise implicitly and gradually. 
That is, there is a process of conventionalisation and conventionalisedness is a matter of 
degree, so some of these ways of issuing an order/request may be more established, closer to 
being full-blown conventions, than others. 
 Finally, recall L&S’s point that there are cross-linguistic differences in the verbal 
construction used for placing an order in a restaurant. While English speakers often use the 
‘Can I …?’ expression, speakers of another language might use some other expression, 
perhaps their language’s equivalent of ‘It would be pleasing to me if …’.  While this is 
undoubtedly true, it is not evidence against a pragmatic derivation of the request/order in each 
case; rather, it may simply reflect differences in the cultural contexts and behavioural norms 
within which the usage originated. In any of these cases, it can be plausibly argued that there 
was an original pragmatic inference which resulted in the order/request interpretation.  
 
4. Lexical innovation and pragmatics 
Some kinds of lexical innovation can occur in communication without any need for explicit 
announcement that something new is being introduced. Speakers may use existing words in a 
new sense that is semantically related to its established sense or may coin a new word that is 
semantically related to an existing word; in both cases, hearers are very often able to 
pragmatically infer the new sense/word without needing any explicit explanation. Consider, 
for instance, the following examples of motivated word coinages, cases where an existing 
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common noun or a proper name (‘porch’, ‘wrist’, ‘Houdini’) is employed as a verb (taken 
from Clark & Clark 1979):  
 
10. a. The boy porched the newspaper.      
 b.  She managed to wrist the ball neatly over the net. 
 c. The prisoner houdinied his way out of the locked cell.    
    
Focusing on (c): even if you’ve never encountered this verbal use of the name ‘Houdini’ 
before, you’ll very likely be able to figure out its intended meaning, provided you have the 
requisite world knowledge about the man Houdini, specifically that he was renowned for his 
ability to escape, against the odds, from all sorts of situations of extreme physical 
confinement.  This, again, is a matter of pragmatics and, again, relevance theorists have given 
accounts of the inferential process involved (driven by the goal of deriving an interpretation 
which meets a particular standard of relevance). The proposition expressed can be 
paraphrased as ‘The prisoner made an extraordinary escape out of the locked cell’ 
 Once the audience has identified the property the speaker intended to denote with the 
verb ‘houdini’, this is public truth-conditional content and should, therefore, go onto the 
conversational record, although it has involved a local pragmatic process of inferring the 
concept the speaker intends by her use of ‘houdini’, i.e. pragmatics has played a role in the 
delivery of content here, not just in disambiguating.
8
 There is nothing exceptional about this, 
as the dictionary shows us, with its many instances of both denominal verbs and deverbal 
                                                          
8
  Emma Borg (p.c.) has suggested to me that L&S might claim that this pragmatically inferred meaning doesn’t 
go onto the conversational record, but rather onto whatever record keeps track of imaginatively recovered 
meaning. But, first, it is far from obvious that this is a case of imaginatively recovered meaning; if it is, it would 
follow that the utterance has no propositional content (nor even any literal meaning), contrary to apparent fact. 
Second, it is unclear that there is, or should be, any public record of imaginatively derived effects, given their 
individual and subjective nature; certainly L&S give no account of how that kind of meaning is recorded or how 
it affects the ongoing communicative interaction of speakers.   
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nouns. These are just two of the many kinds of innovative uses of language which our 
pragmatic capacities make possible. 
 L&S acknowledge the importance of accommodating lexical innovation in their 
account, but only discuss one sort of case in any detail. This is the introducing of a new 
proper name, which is quite different from the pragmatically-based innovations I’ve been 
discussing. Here is their description of such a case: ‘Say somebody announces that they have 
a new pet dog, called Luna. On Kripke’s (1972) understanding, the utterance initiates the 
audience into a network of causal chains that connect them via the name Luna to that dog.’ 
(p.223). And they claim that part of what’s involved in getting onto the conversational 
scoreboard is that interlocutors take on specific commitments that govern the institution of 
new meanings: ‘Following Kripke (1972), interlocutors must jointly commit to preserve the 
link between the name and its referent. Or consider a newly-coined general term. Its meaning 
depends on the joint commitments of interlocutors to triangulate a consistent, useful and 
natural distinction between the things that satisfy the word and the things that don’t.’ (p.224) 
 The cases at issue here (new proper names or new general terms, e.g. ‘smanela’ for a 
newly discovered breed of marsupial) are opaque and unmotivated, that is, they are not 
inferable via pragmatic principles from existing linguistic meaning conventions associated 
with the word. So there are two importantly distinct sources of new meaning conventions: (i) 
New proper names and new general terms involve the establishing of a meaning convention in 
a more or less explicit way (sometimes by overt stipulation); they are introduced with a view 
to being accepted as regular, stable, established meanings, underpinned by general naming 
conventions and the commitments we incur to use them consistently. This is not a matter of 
pragmatics; (ii) The kinds of innovative uses of language that have a pragmatic basis, such as 
the meaning shifts and motivated word coinings that I’ve discussed above, do not come with 
any built-in assumption that a convention is being instituted. They are ad hoc, for the 
particular occasion of use, and whether conventional meaning does or does not eventuate 
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depends on all manner of contingencies of future communicative interactions in the particular 
language community. Unaccountably, L&S omit all mention of this latter (predominant) 
source of new linguistic meaning conventions.  
 
5. Conceptions of linguistic knowledge  
My main aim in this commentary has been, if not to refute, to raise strong doubt about L&S’s 
claim that the shared content of utterances is entirely a matter of linguistic and discourse 
conventions, and the only role played by pragmatics is disambiguation. I’ve argued that 
pragmatics can and often does play a content-contributing role in our meaning-making. It can 
provide audiences with occasion-specific content that is not a matter of linguistic convention, 
as in the ad hoc quantity implicature cases and the relevance-based enrichments of truth-
conditional content. It is also one of the primary means by which an initial meaning 
coordination is achieved when a new linguistic expression or new sense of an existing form is 
produced, making for a precedent, which, through repeated use, may result in a new meaning 
convention.  
 To conclude, I want to touch briefly on a different matter, one that is highly relevant to 
the appropriate positioning of L&S’s stance within the scientific study of human language. 
There is a massive and striking disparity between the way L&S conceive of linguistic 
knowledge and grammar, and the way these are conceived of by linguists working in the 
generative grammar tradition (e.g. Chomsky 2000). The operative notion for these linguists is 
‘I-language’, a component of the human mind whose workings are largely inaccessible to 
consciousness and whose mature state is underpinned by an innately-given species-specific 
‘language faculty’, such that the acquired elements of the system are essentially just a set of 
constrained parameter-fixing options. As L&S themselves note: ‘Linguists’ understanding of 
the language faculty fits poorly with the assumption that linguistic meaning is conventional in 
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Lewis’s sense.’ (p.244). The linguistic knowledge at issue is simply not a matter of 
conventions of any sort and certainly does not include such ‘know-how’ as how to place an 
order politely in a restaurant or how a discourse is structured.   
 L&S are concerned with linguistic behaviour, in particular linguistic communicative 
behaviour and ‘public meaning-making’, a social competence. While this behaviour would 
not be possible without I-language and the unbounded array of meaningful structures it 
enables, by itself I-language is communicatively inert and, according to many linguists, did 
not evolve for communication. The linguistic meaning that comes from grammar or I-
language simply places constraints on what can be said/communicated, while, on top of it, as 
it were, there is a great mass of communicative and other social conventions that come into 
play in the use of language in human interaction. That there are (at least) two different levels 
of theorising to be distinguished here is especially evident in thinking about ‘the’ mental 
lexicon. There are the lexical atoms (or feature bundles) that are the input to the syntax and so 
part of the I-language, and then there is the array of memorised form-meaning pairs that 
accumulate in a speech community, including families of related words and senses that are the 
result of on-line ad hoc pragmatic inferences which have stabilised into shared 
communicative conventions.
9
 In the long run, what we want is an account of our knowledge 
of language and its communicative use that properly distinguishes its component parts and 
their basis: I-language, grounded in our inherent cognitive makeup, is one such component 
and meaning conventions, many of them grounded in pragmatics, are another. 
 
Department of Linguistics 
University College London 
                                                          
9
  Jackendoff (1997) maintains that the lexicon contains not only words and idiomatic phrases (e.g. ‘spill the 
beans’), but an array of other memorised forms, including conventional greetings, standard collocations (e.g. 
‘rancid butter’, ‘beg the question’), names and clichés. These are all shared meaning conventions of the sort that 
L&S are concerned with. 
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